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黄山市政风建设、外来投资者、个体私营企业、台侨资企业投诉管理暂行办法

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黄山市政风建设、外来投资者、个体私营企业、台侨资企业投诉管理暂行办法

安徽省黄山市人民政府


黄山市人民政府公报(2004年第9号)
批转市监察局关于《黄山市政风建设外来投资者个体私营企业台侨资企业投诉管理暂行办法》的通知

黄政秘〔2004〕76号

 

各区、县人民政府,黄山管委会,市政府各部门、各直属机构:
现将《黄山市政风建设、外来投资者、个体私营企业、台侨资企业投诉管理暂行办法》批转给你们,请认真贯彻执行。

黄山市人民政府
二○○四年八月五日



黄山市政风建设、外来投资者、个体私营企业、台侨资企业投诉管理暂行办法

第一章 总 则

第一条 为进一步优化投资发展环境,改进政府机关工作作风,提高行政效率和依法行政水平,维护企业、投资者和人民群众的合法权益,根据《中华人民共和国行政监察法》、《安徽省人民政府关于规范行政行为改善投资环境的决定》(以下简称《决定》)、《黄山市机关效能监察实施办法》(以下简称《实施办法》),特制定本办法。
第二条 本市行政区域内所有外来投资者、个体私营企业、台侨资企业以及其他经济组织和个人(以下简称投诉者),均可按照本办法进行投诉。
第三条 县级以上人民政府均设置政风建设、外来投资者、个体私营企业、台侨资企业四个投诉受理中心(以下简称投诉受理中心),设立公开投诉电话。市、县(区)两级四个投诉受理中心分别设在本级人民政府监察机关。
市投诉受理中心投诉电话:2355024

第二章 受 理

第四条 本市行政区域内政风建设、外来投资者、个体私营企业、台侨资企业以及其他经济组织和个人对行政机关(包括行使行政管理职能的组织)及其工作人员违反《决定》、《实施办法》和有关法律、法规或者规章的行为,均可向四个投诉受理中心投诉。
(一)不执行或不严格执行市委、市政府有关优化经济发展环境、机关效能建设规定的行为;
(二)对符合法律、法规、规章和政策规定的事项拖延不办或不按程序办事的行为;
(三)玩忽职守,不认真履行职务(岗位)职责,工作推诿,效率低下,给管理、服务相对人造成延误或损失的行为;
(四)违反政务公开规定,不履行公开和告知义务,损害管理、服务相对人知情权的行为;
(五)不履行公开承诺或承诺后不践诺的行为;
(六)假公济私,故意纵容或庇护不正当竞争的行为;
(七)滥用职权,利用工作或职务之便故意刁难或“吃、拿、卡、要”的行为;
(八)工作弄虚作假,欺上瞒下,有令不行,有禁不止的行为;
(九)违反法律、法规、规章和有关规定收费、罚款、摊派或检查的行为;
(十)违法强买强卖,强行指定中介服务机构的行为;
(十一)以赞助、捐助、宣传、评比、业务咨询、勘验评估形式变相收费的行为;
(十二)其他影响经济发展环境和机关效能建设的行为。
第五条 投诉者进行投诉,可以采取口头投诉(电话或来访)或者书面投诉两种方式。
(一)口头投诉方式:对口头投诉的,投诉受理中心应当场记录投诉者的基本情况以及投诉对象、请求、事实、理由和时间等内容。
(二)书面投诉方式:对重大投诉事项,投诉者应当提交书面材料。书面投诉材料应当包括投诉者合法有效的身份证明以及投诉对象、请求、事实、理由和时间等内容,并注明投诉者的通讯地址和联系方式。

第三章 办 理

第六条 投诉受理中心对投诉者投诉事项应当及时登记办理。投诉受理中心自接到投诉之日起,如能协调解决的应及时帮助协调解决;不能协调解决的,5日内将受理情况通知投诉者。
第七条 对重大投诉事项,投诉受理中心有权督促有关行政机关按照下列规定处理投诉者的投诉:
(一)对事实清楚、情节简单的投诉事项,由投诉受理中心移送有关行政机关办理,有关行政机关应当自接到投诉之日起5个工作日内办理完毕。
(二)对事实不清、情节复杂的投诉事项,由投诉受理中心对投诉事项进行初步审查后于3个工作日内提出交办意见,并移送有关行政机关办理。有关行政机关自接到转办通知之日起,在15个工作日内办理完毕,最长不得超过20个工作日。
(三)对须由几个行政机关共同办理的投诉事项,由投诉受理中心指定其中一个行政机关负责组织有关部门按照本条第(二)项规定的期限办理。
因特殊情况需要延长办理期限的,应当提前报本级人民政府监察机关批准,并向投诉者说明理由。
第八条 由下列情形之一的投诉,可以终结:
(一)经投诉受理中心或者有关机关协调,争议双方当事人达成一致意见,纠纷得到解决的;
(二)在受理投诉过程中,投诉者就投诉事项申请行政复议或者提请行政诉讼的;
(三)投诉者自愿放弃投诉的;
(四)投诉者无正当理由不参加协调或者拒绝与投诉受理中心联系、配合的;
(五)有其他可终结情形的。
第九条 投诉事项由投诉受理中心组织有关行政机关办理的,投诉受理中心应当自办理完结之日起3个工作日内将处理结果答复投诉者;移送由有关行政机关办理的,有关行政机关应当自办理完毕之日起3个工作日内直接答复投诉者,并抄报投诉受理中心。
第十条 投诉受理中心负责综合投诉事项办理情况,每半年向本级人民政府报告一次;对重大投诉事项的办理情况,应当随时向本级人民政府报告。

第四章 中心权限

第十一条 投诉受理中心履行职责,有权采取下列措施:
(一)要求监察投诉对象提供投诉与监察事项有关的文件、资料及其相关资料,并就监察投诉的问题做出说明,并要求监察投诉对象协助、配合投诉调查。
(二)责令监察投诉对象停止、纠正违反法律、法规、规章和党委、政府的决定、命令及经济发展环境、机关效能建设规定的行为,并要求在规定时间内正确履行职责和义务。
(三)要求监察投诉对象对所造成的危害采取必要补救措施。
(四)对违反经济发展环境和机关效能建设有关规定的监察投诉对象,建议其主管部门或有关部门给予相应的组织、人事处理;对违纪的监察投诉对象,视情节轻重给予相应的党纪政纪处分。
(五)对破坏经济发展环境、机关效能建设的典型案例予以曝光。

第五章 办理责任

第十二条 在办理投诉过程中,如发现行政机关及其工作人员有违纪行为的,由有关机关或监察部门按照《安徽省行政机关及其工作人员违反省人民政府关于规范行政行为改善投资环境决定行为的行政处分暂行规定》和《实施办法》予以处理。
第十三条 对移送办理的投诉事项,有关行政机关拖延推诿、弄虚作假或者不按照规定办理投诉事项的,由投诉受理中心给予通报批评;造成不良影响或者损失的,由投诉受理中心提请有关部门依法追究直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员的责任。
第十四条 投诉受理中心工作人员在办理投诉事项中,玩忽职守、徇私舞弊、滥用职权、收受贿赂的,由有关部门依法追究行政责任;情节严重、构成犯罪的,移送司法机关依法追究刑事责任。

第六章 附 则

第十五条 本办法实施中的具体问题,由市监察局负责解释。
第十六条 本办法自批转之日起施行,原办法废止。

 

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Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.

化学工业部科技开发基金贷款管理办法(试行)

化工部


化学工业部科技开发基金贷款管理办法(试行)

1991年3月27日,化工部

第一条 资金投入是化学工业科技进步的重要条件。当前要千方百计地开拓经费渠道,广聚财源,提高对科技进步的支持强度,增强推动科技进步的物质力量。化学工业部决定设立化学工业科技开发基金。
第二条 化学工业部科技开发基金属引导和匹配制性质贷款,实行定期有偿使用。
第三条 凡化工系统承担化学工业部科技任务,具有法人资格并实行独立经济核算的全民所有制企业、事业单位,都可申请本基金贷款。
第五条 贷款项目必须具备下列条件:
(一)应是科技成果转化为商品的项目,即从实验室到中间试验和工业化试生产阶段的项目;
(二)要有较大的科技意义,所采用的技术要先进适用。没有新的技术含量的单纯扩大生产规模、技术改造和基本建设项目不得使用本贷款;
(三)要有较好的市场前景和经济效益,包括项目完成后推广于生产中的经济效益。
第六条 贷款实行匹配制,申请科技开发基金贷款单位的匹配奖金、自有资金额度不得低于百分之三十,申请贷款时必须同时附有匹配资金证明。
第七条 贷款的申请程序
(一)用款单位需提出贷款申请,并附有关用款项目报告及同级计划、财务、科技等部门的审核意见,报送化学工业部科技司、计划司、经调司及有关专业司局各一份;
(二)用款单位在立项前必须认真做好项目评估、可行性论证等工作,以确保项目的经济效益及社会效益。
第八条 贷款的核批手续
(一)为了用好科技开发基金贷款,化学工业部成立科技开发基金贷款审查委员会,该委员会由化学工业部技术委员会、经调司、计划司、科技司、专业司各一名领导同志组成,办事机构设在经调司,具体受理贷款申请;
(二)为确保资金周转有借有还,用款单位提出贷款申请时,必须同时提供所在地开户行出具的承兑汇票或有合格的单位担保者;
(三)贷款项目的可行性,由化学工业部科技开发基金贷款审查委员会审查把关。项目采取定期审查方式,暂定每季审查一次;
(四)贷款采用分级分档核批办法。贷款金额100万元以上的,由化学工业部开发基金贷款审查委员会审查后,请主管部长核批。贷款金额100万元以下的,经化学工业部科技开发基金贷款审查委员会审查后,签署意见,由经调司办理;
(五)贷款经批准后,由用款单位持有关批件同化学工业部签订贷款合同,贷款合同经双方签字、盖章后生效。
第九条 贷款的利息及使用期限
(一)贷款利率一律优惠,月利率和年利率均低于同期同档次银行利率的30%。为了充分发挥资金的使用效益,本贷款采取在上述利率范围内浮动交纳的办法;对于确实能推动化工科技进步、社会效益显著而单位经济效益较差的项目,给予免息或减息50%的优惠。对于提前归还贷款,加速资金周转的,按每提前一个月还款,给予减息20%,直至全部免息为止的优惠。但本金不予抵免利息。
(二)贷款使用期限不得超过二年,逾期者,贷款利率调至同期同档次银行利率水平,并按原利率加50%计收罚息。
第十条 贷款的日常管理
(一)各级主管部门要加强对本贷款使用情况的监督,经常了解项目进度及效益情况,并为其解决困难;
(二)用款单位到年度终了或项目完成时,须向化学工业部经调司、科技司上报贷款的使用情况和项目的完成情况报告,坚决杜绝对于贷款的使用无人过问、无人监督的现象,严格建立对贷款使用的跟踪反馈制度;
(三)各用款单位负责人及有关人员,特别是广大财务人员,必须严格树立专款专用思想,不得将本款用于与科研工作无关的项目,不得将本贷款用于预算(包括福利和奖励)支出,如有违背此原则者,化学工业部将立即收回贷款,或从该单位其他拨款中扣回;
(四)用款单位使用本贷款过程中要信守合同,建立起科研工作中的信誉,即保证按期拿出科研成果,又保证到期及时归还本息;
(五)用款单位广大财务人员,特别是财务负责人,要充分发挥财务监督的职能,对本单位的项目要自始至终予以监督,发现问题及时指正,并向部经调司反映。各单位要尊重财务人员的意见,服从财务人员的监督,决不允许任何人、以任何形式和借口进行打击报复。
第十一条 本办法由化学工业部负责解释。
第十二条 本办法自一九九一年四月一日开始施行。



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